Overfishing in a stateless society
The way you prevent overfishing in a stateless society is the same way you prevent any crime: make it illegal with explicit punishments and/or the threat of outlawing. Outlawing means to set a person outside of the law, that is they have no legal protections if any crime is committed against them. So that is very simple, once we have the basics of free-market law laid down, you just punish overfishing as a criminal offense. The difficulty is calculation. That is, calculating how much is being fished and how much should be fished to maintain the integrity of the global fish stock.
There are 4 players in my solution to the problem of overfishing, and in the text version of this book I have a diagram. The 4 players are:
1. The Law Agencies
2. The ITQ Agencies (ITQ stands for individual transferable quota)
3. The Harbors
4. The Fishers
The Law agencies approves the ITQ agencies. This is because overfishing is a legal issue, and the legal agency is that which prosecutes the crime of overfishing. The ITQ agency does all of the calculating for the Law Agency.
The ITQ agencies must come up with a consensus of how many of each type of fish can be fished in each general location. They must deal with overlapping migratory patterns and all of that stuff that is apparently complex. Once consensus is reached, however it is reached - perhaps an annual meeting or even a series of virtual meetings, that is the quota.
ITQ agencies would have to figure out how to pay for the scientific research, and because the Law Agencies and the ITQ agencies are interdependent, the Law Agency would not have an incentive to approve an ITQ agency that wasn't paying their "fair share" for scientific research on the fish populations that cluster of ITQ agencies happen to monitor. And the Law Agencies are interdependent on each other for recognition, and so a Law Agency that approved an ITQ agency that didn't pay for scientific research but used the research of others would face sanction from the other Law Agencies - such as penalties against the customers of he "rogue" law agency in matters of disputes between members of different law agencies.
The ITQ quotas are then sold off to the harbors. Harbors bid on the fish quotas for their respective areas. This will result in the harbors that believe they can catch the most fish bidding for the most credits. The harbors then sell these ITQ credits to the fishers. The fishers then own the fish they catch. Once the fish are caught and the credits are deducted, the fishermen then own the fish outright and can do with them what they please.
Each region has ITQ credits for each fish type. For example "Hudson bay Halibut" or "Chesapeake Bay Tuna" or whatever fish are in those regions. Each harbor that takes in fish must be approved by an ITQ agency or else be outlawed. An outlawed harbor is open for pillaging. This is where our old enemy the corporation actually becomes useful, because the harbor can be outlawed without outlawing the individual employees, and so the harbor will be pillaged without the employees getting massacred.
The harbors are all connected and the fish that go through the quotas are all databased. This can be done by weight or number, however these things are done, I'm not an expert on the sundries of fishing metrics. The fish-counting would be done by the ITQ agents at the harbors. The most efficient fishermen would be the most willing to pay more for the ITQ credits.
Harbors would bid on credits from the ITQ agencies. However, they could buy credits from any ITQ agency that is approved by a legal agency, and so the cost of the ITQ credits for the harbors would gradually approach the cost of counting fish at the harbors plus the research pool cost. The ITQ agencies would be competing for business by harbors who choose to buy credits from them, but they also have to do their job well enough to be approved by the legal agency.
If the ITQ agencies overestimate the number fish that can be fished, they will risk having their approval from the legal agencies suspended, as environmental activist groups could file a lawsuit against them for "enabling the crime of overfishing". If they underestimate the number of fish that can be fished, then new ITQ agencies will come on line, and if the new ITQ agencies are formed by prestigious individuals they should have no trouble getting initial legal approval.
Who will oppose the ITQ system?
Short-sighted fishermen
Short-sighted consumers
Fish-farms
Who will support the ITQ system?
Far-sighted fishermen
Far-sighted consumers
Environmentally concerned people
The only disharmony I can envision is with the harbors. There is only so much space to build a harbor, and so they can easily cartelize and sell ITQ credits to fishermen at the monopoly rate. The natural regulation against this would be indirect competitors: if wild fish becomes too expensive as a result of harbor cartelization, more people will buy from fish-farms, or just buy other types of food. And harbor monopolization is systematically unlikely because of the firms being bought out raising their buyout-price as the would-be monopolist gets closer and closer to a monopoly, and cartels are inherently unstable. Because of these mitigating factors I will say that the harbors will behave in a slightly cartelistic manner.
But other than that overfishing does not seem too difficult.